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The recent landmark election results in 2010 witnessed the end of an era for Labour under 
Gordon Brown and the herald of a new political landscape with the Coalition government of the 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats.  The challenges for the new coalition are no less daunting 
than they were under the former government. The need to examine aspects of British identity 
from political and cultural perspectives has never been more poignant, especially in the face of 
continuing threats from domestic and international extremism – both far right and religious. The 
defeat of the BNP in Dagenham last year, resulting in all of its twelve councilors failing to be 
reelected can be considered a positive outcome for British politics so far as right wing extremism 
is concerned. The increase in Muslim MPs is also considered by many as another positive for 
British politics. While these apparent achievements may reflect the more appealing façade of the 
political climate, a redefining of who and what represents Muslim identity in 21st century Britain 
is necessary in view of the increasing misunderstanding and rictus gap between wider non-
Muslim  society and Muslim communities.
A question of legitimacy: Who can and should speak on behalf of British Muslims?
It can be argued that the very question of legitimacy is what underscored part of the Liberal 
Democrats’ reasoning to align themselves with the Conservatives and form a coalition 
government. Labour was no longer considered a legitimate representative for this country’s 
government in view of the losses inflicted upon them in the recent election. Brown was an 
unelected Prime Minister assuming the mantle of Tony Blair. The transfer of leadership was on 
the basis of Labour parliamentary protocol and while it may be argued that the Conservatives did 
not win unanimously, Labour lost unequivocally. 
Legitimacy should also be the yard stick to measure those claiming to represent sections of 
British society. The BNP were resigned to defeat in east London as a racist, bigoted party, 
unrepresentative of the vast majority they claimed to represent. They placed emphasis on anti-
Muslim sentiment in order to garner support from various communities, religious and irreligious, 
on the premise of creating resentment and fear of the ‘alien other.’ To some degree they have 
succeeded in attracting support from communities that were previously considered antithetical to 
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their manifesto and objectives. For example, a few members from Black and Ethnic Minority 
(BME) communities now bolster the BNP’s ‘anti-Muslim’ support. Claims of legitimacy are not 
confined to these groups alone; Muslim led organisations have emerged post 9/11 and 7/7 with 
claims of representing the ‘silent majority’ of Muslims etc. However, a closer look at the lens 
through which these groups claim self-legitimacy will reveal the cracks and inconsistencies that 
tends to permeate their often polemical positions which in themselves are unrepresentative of the 
very communities they allege to represent.
Indeed, the failure to examine and challenge the legitimacy of self-publicised stories or claims 
can be damaging to some of the communities from where these individuals or groups first 
emerge.  In fact, such negligence in ascertaining the legitimacy of claims for the moral high 
ground have led to a proliferation of personalities either claiming a return from extremism, a 
return within the fold of democratic society as ‘prodigal sons’ or as experts in the field of 
counter-radicalisation and extremism. Prior to the emergence of an extensive budget for the 
previous government’s Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Fund many of these voices were 
largely non-existent. Much criticism has been leveled against the PVE Funding; indeed, to a 
certain degree it is valid, especially insofar as it relates to the ineffectiveness of some 
organisations that received funding. The author of this account has himself been criticised for an 
altogether different reason; namely, that being a so-called ‘non-violent radical’ is part of the 
problem and not the solution. A direct response to such criticism can be in regard to the issue of 
legitimacy, credibility and effectiveness in tackling violent extremism at grassroots – are the 
entities involved succeeding or not? Another response to such criticism is the simple observation 
on the additional but important factor relating to consistency - such entities have been consistent 
over the past 15-20 years combating violent extremist propaganda. There have been no 
rudimentary shifts in either ideology or methodology unlike more recently established 
organisations whose founders have completely metamorphosed into more societally palatable 
groups in order to join the ever evolving counter-radicalisation arena. Is there anything to 
determine whether further transformations will occur in the future to accord with changing 
government policies and if so, what shape will they take? The chameleon-like characteristic of 
adapting to new environments and circumstances in order to fit either public or government 
perceptions or agendas should be a warning sign to policy makers and practitioners alike, 
particularly in the latters’ race to provide ‘quick-fix’ solutions to counter violent radicalisation 
and terrorism  among British Muslims today. The tendency to ‘stir up anti-Muslim sentiment in 
an attempt to confer self-legitimacy’ [1]  should be another clear indicator to err on the side of 
caution when attempting to identify credible voices or partners among Muslim communities. 
Shared beliefs, shared values and social conservatism
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The socially conservative practices of some Muslims are increasingly being regarded as anti-
social and a precursor to violent radicalisation. Yet many of these values held by such Muslims 
are akin to those of our parents and grandparents in 1940s-50s Britain. In fact, the values and 
beliefs held are not too dissimilar from those of the other Asiatic religions - Judaism and 
Christianity - yet there is no current discourse available which accuses these faiths of anti-
socialism or violent – radicalism. 
Indeed, there are many adherents to various aspects of social conservatism from different walks 
of life in the UK today and they are not marginalised for aspects of their beliefs or values that do 
not concur entirely with society. Indeed, they possess beliefs and values that accord  more with  
traditional societal beliefs than those at odds with it. This is the same with the vast majority of 
Muslims.  Many socially conservative Muslims have accepted a religious pluralism in Britain 
where they do not seek to impose their beliefs on others and, at the same time, not have some 
societal values – that have changed with the passage of time – imposed upon them as a 
requirement to prove their Britishness.  Until now, the issue of religious social conservatism has 
been largely a one sided affair, dominated by the usual suspects who are the most vocal in 
seeking to define Muslim identity in 21st century Britain. There is a need to redress this 
imbalance. 
Bridging existing areas of dissonance between Muslim communities and the wider majority 
society
British Muslim converts have an even more important role to play today in society in view of 
their dual identities. Their voices have, on the whole, been muted in part due to more vocal 
representations by the larger, predominant South Asian Muslim populace in Britain. While this is 
unsurprising due to the multifarious and complex social dimensions of this largely progressive 
section of Muslims, their representation of almost everything that is supposed to reflect Muslim 
‘Britishness’ should now be reexamined in view of the existence and growing influence of 
British converts to Islam.  Roald raises the following question when examining the impact of 
converts in a Scandinavian context:
How important is the role of new Muslims as intermediaries between Muslim communities and 
Scandinavian society? Is the particular position of new Muslims who have ‘one foot in each 
culture’ beneficial for a fruitful dialogue between the two cultures?
Muslim converts traverse all spheres of British society and yet their voices are seldom heard 
against the backdrop of socio-economic, political and religious issues that by and large relate to 
the predominant South Asian (and of late, increasingly Somali) culture. 
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Converts may have greater empathy with non-Muslims because of their non-Muslim past and 
ongoing relationships with their family of origin. They often have a heightened awareness, 
compared to other Muslims, of how Muslims are viewed by outsiders, so there can be a strongly 
reflexive element to their discourse.
Without ignoring or marginalising the overwhelmingly positive contributions of these more 
predominant communities, British converts can play an invaluable role as conduits or bridge-
builders between the wider non-Muslim society and the more culturally orientated Muslim 
communities. To varying degrees, some converts are already playing such roles, however not on 
the scale of their European counterparts:
New Muslims function on various levels in society and...[those] who have a role as intermediary 
between Muslim immigrant communities and wider Scandinavian society are mostly highly 
educated. As academics they have the ability to promote a balanced view of Islam and Muslims 
that might be accepted by majority society. They also tend...to distinguish between ‘ideal Islam’ 
and ‘Muslim practice’...By this, non-Muslims might more easily understand the complexity and 
the problematic issues of Muslim communities in Western society.
The importance of converts’ potential contribution between wider society and Muslim 
communities can no longer be ignored when considering the challenges of far right and religious 
extremism in society today. 
Dr. Baker is the former chairman of Brixton Mosque, London, the founder and a Director of 
STREET UK intervention programme and a Lecturer in Terrorism Studies at the University of St 
Andrews.  Based upon his 20 years of knowledge and experience in countering violent 
extremism, he has become an international speaker on the subject of radicalisation and 
extremism, and is widely acknowledged as an authority on in this field.
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